In Re Adjancote Acquisition; Klu v. Agyemang II [1982-83] GLR 852-863

Material Facts:

The Government of Ghana acquired land described as Adjancote. Disputes arose as to whom compensation should be paid to, as the Berekusu Stool, Nuumo Nmashi family, and Nii Dowuona family all claimed ownership of the land and relied on traditional evidence to prove their claim.

Procedural History:

The Land Tribunal upheld the claim of the Berekusu Stool, and the other claimants appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Land Tribunal erred in preferring the traditional evidence of the Berekusu Stool to that of the traditional evidence of the other claimants.

Holding:

The Land Tribunal erred when it preferred the traditional evidence of the Berekusu Stool to that of the traditional evidence of the other claimants.

Ratio Decidendi:

It was unclear why the Land Tribunal preferred the traditional story of the Berekusu Stool to that of the other claimants. To resolve the present dispute, their lordships deem it fit to resolve a question on the extent to which Ghanaian courts have treated and accepted oral traditional evidence as sufficient to establish title to land. Per the research of their lordships, the authorities reveal the following guiding principles:

(1) Oral evidence of tradition is admissible in the courts of West Africa and may be relied upon to discharge the onus of proof if it is supported by the evidence of living people of facts within their own knowledge: see Commissioner of Lands v. Adagun (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 206.

(2) Where it appears that the evidence as to title is mainly traditional in character on each side and there is little to choose between the rival conflicting stories the person on whom the onus of proof rests must fail in the decree he seeks: see Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336 and Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana family [1959] G.L.R. 362.

(3) Where there is a conflict of traditional history, the best way to find out which side is probably right is by reference to recent acts in relation to the land: see Yaw v. Atta [1961] G.L.R. 513.

(4) Where claims of parties to an action are based upon traditional history which conflict with each other, the best way of resolving the conflict is by paying due regard to the accepted facts in the case which are not in dispute, and the traditional evidence supported by the accepted facts is the most probable: see Beng v. Poku [1965] G.L.R. 167.

(5) Where the whole evidence in a case is based on oral tradition not within living memory, it is unsafe to rely on the demeanour of the witnesses to resolve conflicts in the case: see Adjeibi-Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 257, P.C.

…

(6) Where the admission of one party establishes that the other party has been in long undisturbed possession and occupation of the disputed land, the party making the admission assumes the onus to prove that such possession is inconsistent with ownership. The law is that such a person in possession and occupation is entitled to the protection of the law against the whole world except the true owner or someone who can prove a better title: see Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana Family (supra).

(7) In a claim for title to land where none is able to show title because of want of evidence, or that the evidence is confusing and conflicting, the safest guide to determining the rights of the parties is by reference to possession: see [p.858] Summey v. Yohuno [1962] 1 G.L.R. 160 at p. 167 per van Lare J.S.C.

It is with these guiding principles that the court will resolve the present dispute. In the present case, their lordships are of the view that as none of the witnesses had personal knowledge of the matters they testified on,

The safest guide which the tribunal should have adopted in resolving the conflicts in the case presented by the parties was by paying due regards to the accepted facts in the case which were not in dispute and the traditional evidence supported by the accepted facts.

In the present case, it is not disputed that subjects of the other claimants (appellants) occupy or possess all the villages very close to the acquired area (Adjancote). Second, the respondent admitted that one Ojo Ablorh, a member of the appellant’s followers, is farming in the acquired area. In the opinion of their lordship,

The admission by the respondent of possession and occupation by a member of the appellant's followers of a portion of the acquired area and the founding of the villages established by them within its vicinity throw a very heavy burden on the respondent who claims to have granted and permitted these possessions and occupation to show that such possession and occupation are not in their own right. This is especially so in view of the stand taken by the appellant who deny his control over areas occupied by his followers including the acquired area.

This burden the respondent was unable to discharge. He was unable to show either that any of the appellant's followers paid tribute or do homage to his stool. The evidence is to the contrary. It shows that the appellant's followers hold the villages they have established around the hill in their own right and have since time immemorial been in undisturbed possession and control.

Also, in light of this occupation and possession, and per the provisions in The State Property and Contracts Act, 1960 (CA 6), there is a rebuttable presumption of ownership in favour of appellants.